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Comments
Is There Life After Bryan?: The Validity of Rule
10b-5's Misappropriation Theory
INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "1934 Act"),' the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") has gained appreciation for the potential of Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act and its offspring, Rule 10b-5, for combatting the
use of inside information in securities transactions. From its
humble origins, Rule 10b-5 has become the SEC's primary tool
in waging this war. At the present time, a recent decision in the
Fourth Circuit, which invalidated the misappropriation theory of
culpability under Rule 10b-5, threatens the SEC's arsenal.
For fifteen years, the SEC has used the misappropriation
theory to expand the scope of Rule LOb-5 to include within its
ambit those who misappropriated confidential corporate informa-
tion in breach of a duty of confidentiality and profited from the
use of such information in securities transactions. The signifi-
cance of the theory is its inclusion of those who are not tradi-
tional corporate insiders. Simply put, the theory brings certain
"outsiders" within the range of Rule 10b-5.
The Fourth Circuit invalidated the misappropriation theory
essentially on the ground that United States Supreme Court
precedent conclusively determined that, in cases of nondisclo-
sure, the fraud element of Rule 10b-5 has to be satisfied by a
breach of a duty to disclose which is owed to the seller of securi-
ties. According to the Fourth Circuit, precedent establishes that
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1981).
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the fraud element cannot be satisfied by a fraud occurring else-
where in relation to the security transaction.
This comment first traces the evolution of Rule 10b-5 with
respect to the traditional theory of culpability, and then discuss-
es the outgrowth of the misappropriation theory. It next consid-
ers whether the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that
the fraud element of Rule 10b-5, in context to criminal prosecu-
tions, is definitively restricted to a breach of the duty to disclose
or abstain in cases of nondisclosure. Analysis reveals that the
Fourth Circuit's conclusiveness with respect to the definition of
fraud in Rule 10b-5 was premature. Additionally, this comment
examines the legislative history accompanying the enactment of
Section 10(b) and the administrative history of the rule to an-
swer the question: Did Congress and the SEC intend to specifi-
cally limit the concept of fraud to the security transaction? An-
swering this question in the negative, this comment next dis-
cusses whether Congress gave the SEC policy-making power
with respect to defining the "who, what and where" aspects of
the fraud element. Arguing that Congress gave the SEC such
power, this comment contends that the misappropriation
theory's concept of fraud is a permissible construction of Section
10(b) and a permissible administrative interpretation of Rule
10b-5. In conclusion, an argument is made that the judiciary
should defer to the SEC's construction of Section 10(b) and its
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 as the misappropriation theory is
reasonable in light of the language of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 and their respective legislative and administrative histo-
ries.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5: THE
TRADITIONAL VIEW OF RULE 10b-5 CULPABILITY AND THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
Before the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Acts of
1933 (the "1933 Act")2 and 1934, the federal government only
had the mail fraud statute available to prosecute securities
fraud.3 In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1981).
3. Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3404 (1991). The
mail fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or autho-
rized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
1058 Vol. 34:1057
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enacted anti-fraud legislation specifically directed at the securi-
ties markets. The anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts were aimed at the inequitable trade practices which were
considered a cause of the loss of investor confidence which led to
the stock market's malfunction in 1929.4 Both Acts contain gen-
eral anti-fraud provisions. The original version of Section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act proscribed the use of fraud in the sale of securi-
ties.' Though the language of Section 17(a) could be interpreted
to apply to buyers of securities, the SEC limited its enforcement
of the statute to sellers of securities.' This point is significant in
the development of Section 10(b) because Rule 10b-5 was pro-
mulgated by the SEC to fill the gap left by Section 17(a). Section
10(b) prohibits the "use [of]... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance" in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.7 Unlike Section 17(a), which is self-operative, Section
10(b) gives the SEC the authority to prescribe rules and regula-
tions necessary to carry out Section 10(b)'s anti-fraud provisions
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such mat-
ter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the
person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not
more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
4. Joan K. Martin, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the
Second Circuit Gone Too Far?, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 78, 86 (1986) (citing S. REP.
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933)); see also S. REP NO. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1934).
5. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly--1) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or
property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). The words "offer or" were added in 1954.
6. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 3410.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality, or interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
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to protect the public interest and investors.'
The SEC did not exercise its rule-making authority under
Section 10(b) until 1942 when it promulgated Rule 10b-5.9 Real-
izing that Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act only regulated sellers of
securities, the SEC created Rule 10b-5 to prohibit individuals
and companies from engaging in fraud in the purchase and sale
of securities.' Rule 10b-5 effectively extended the anti-fraud
regulation to buyers of securities.
Initially, courts restricted Rule 10b-5, in actions involving
non-disclosure, to situations where a common law fiduciary duty
existed between the parties to the transaction." The fiduciary
requirement was interjected into Rule 10b-5 analysis because, at
common law, a seller does not have a duty to disclose material
information concerning the transaction absent a duty to do so. 2
The fiduciary requirement effectively limited Rule 10b-5's appli-
cation to corporate insiders defined as corporate directors, offi-
cers and major shareholders because only persons in these ca-
pacities were considered to be in a fiduciary relation with the
shareholders of a corporation. 3
The SEC, pursuant to the broad language of Rule 10b-5, at-
tempted in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 4 to extend the reach of
Rule 10b-5 beyond corporate insiders to include within its regu-
latory power "any person" who through a relationship with the
8. Id.
9. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
10. Martin, supra note 4, at 88 (citing SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 3230 (May 21, 1942)).
11. Id. at 89-90 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464
(2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1953) and Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802-03 (E.D. Pa. 1947)).
12. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980).
13. Richard M. Phillips & Robert J. Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A
Need for Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 73-75 (1984).
14. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In Cady Roberts, the SEC sought to enforce Rule
l0b-5 on a securities broker who sold securities based on nonpublic material corpo-
rate information without disclosing the information. Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 907-
10. The broker received the inside information from a director of the corporation. Id.
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corporation had access to material confidential corporate infor-
mation. 5 In Cady Roberts, SEC Chairman William Cary stated
that the thrust of Rule 10b-5 is to address the "inherent unfair-
ness involved where a party takes advantage of such informa-
tion knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is deal-
ing.""6 He further stated that the reach of the SEC was not to
be limited by "fine distinctions and rigid classifications" with re-
gard to who it prosecuted. 7 Any person who had a "special re-
lationship" with a corporation and was privy to its internal af-
fairs is under a duty to disclose or abstain from trading." Bas-
ing the duty of disclosure on a principle of fairness, Cady Robe-
rts effectively relaxed the fiduciary requirements derived from
the common law concept of fraud.
Following Cady Roberts, the courts deferred to the broad-
ened scope of Rule 10b-5. The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.'" and United States v. Chiarella,'° accepted
the Cady Roberts' view that the disclose or abstain rule could be
based on a principle of fairness. The Second Circuit recognized
that Rule 10b-5 was based on a policy that the investing public
has expectations that all investors who trade through the im-
personal securities market have equal access to material infor-
mation."' According to the Second Circuit, the essence of Rule
10b-5 is one's access to confidential corporate information.22 In




19. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal of a
Rule lOb-5 criminal suit against a geologist who, while employed by a corporation to
conduct exploratory drilling for mineral deposits in Canada, traded in the
corporation's securities based on material confidential corporate information that
indicated that a large mineral deposit was found. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at
839-43, 852. Though the court did not find the geologist to be a director, officer or a
shareholder, it considered him an "insider" by virtue of possessing the inside infor-
mation. Id. at 847-48, 851.
20. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella was
employed by a financial printing company as a "mark-up" man. Chiarella, 588 F.2d
at 1362-63. His employer was hired to print documents dealing with takeover bids.
Id. Though the bids were coded to hide vital information, Chiarella was able to
deduce the name of the target corporation from the documents submitted to be
printed. Id. Chiarella then bought stock in the target corporation before the takeover
bid was made public. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed Chiarella's conviction under
Rule 10b-5, holding that Chiarella violated Rule lob-5 by breaching a duty of dis-
closure. Id. at 1364, 1373. The court based this holding on the principle that any-
one, corporate insider or not, who possesses inside information assumes a duty to
disclose the information before trading or must abstain from trading. Id. at 1365.




this way, the Second Circuit held that the disclosure rule is ap-
plicable to persons who are not traditional insiders.23
The present-day problem facing the SEC with respect to the
scope of Rule 10b-5 arose out of the Supreme Court's reversal of
the Second Circuit's Chiarella holding. Considering the scope of
Rule 10b-5 for the first time, the Supreme Court, in Chiarella v.
United States,24 reemphasized the requirements of the common
law fiduciary duties in situations where an alleged violator of
Rule 10b-5 remains silent in a stock transaction.' The Su-
preme Court observed that Section 10(b) does not state whether
silence may be considered manipulative or deceptive." Howev-
er, the Court adopted the position that silence may be fraudu-
lent if a party to a stock transaction was under a duty of
disclosure via a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust
and confidence with the other party to the transaction and failed
to disclose before trading. 7 The Court stated that it could not
affirm Chiarella's conviction unless it recognized a general duty
placed on all market participants to disclose or abstain.28 With-
out a congressional mandate, the Court refused to contravene
the principles of common law fraud.29
The misappropriation theory originated in Chief Justice
Burger's dissent in Chiarella. Chief Justice Burger recognized
that as a general rule the parties to an arm's-length business
transaction do not have a duty to disclose material information
to the other party unless there is a fiduciary or confidential
relation between them."0 However, Chief Justice Burger argued
that absent a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship, any person
could still violate Rule 10b-5 if such person gained an informa-
tional advantage, not through industry and business acumen,
but through an illegal act.3 Under Chief Justice Burger's con-
ception of the theory, when a person misappropriates inside
information, the misappropriator assumes a duty to disclose or
abstain. 2 According to Chief Justice Burger, a failure to adhere
23. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365.
24. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
25. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28.
26. Id. at 230.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 233.
29. Id.
30. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 240.
32. Id. Chief Justice Burger derived his misappropriation theory from a law
review article written by Page Keeton. The Chief Justice quoted Keeton to establish
a link between the misappropriation and the duty to disclose or abstain:
[TIhe way in which the buyer acquires the information which he conceals from
1062 Vol. 34:1057
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to this duty constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-5. 3
The SEC made an argument based on the misappropriation
theory in Chiarella, but the Supreme Court did not consider
whether Chiarella was culpable for violating Rule 10b-5 under
the theory because the issue was not submitted to the jury.'
Justice Stevens, concurring in Chiarella, noted that "legitimate
arguments" could have been made for and against liability under
the misappropriation theory.35
To regain the ground that it had lost with respect to the scope
of Rule 10b-5 in Chiarella, the SEC, in later cases, advanced the
misappropriation theory of culpability under Rule 10b-5. The
theory has been adopted in the Second, Third, Seventh and
Ninth Circuits."6 The circuits which have adopted the theory,
however, have not accepted the expansive scope suggested by
Chief Justice Burger in his Chiarella dissent, preferring to apply
the misappropriation theory only to misappropriations involving
a breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of confidentiality. 7 This
limitation excludes those who access confidential information
through industrial espionage and theft without a concomitant
breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty.3" Typically, the SEC
has advanced the misappropriation theory in cases involving an
employee's breach of a duty of confidentiality owing to an em-
ployer and the employer's corporate clients.3 " However, the the-
the vendor should be a material circumstance. The information might have
been acquired as the result of his bringing to bear a superior knowledge,
intelligence, skill or technical judgement; it might have been acquired by mere
chance; or it might have been acquired by means of some tortious action on
his part .... Any time information is acquired by an illegal act it would seem
that there should be a duty to disclose that information.
Id. (quoting Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-disclosure, 15 TEXAS L. REV.
1, 25-26 (1936)).
33. Id. at 240-41.
34. Id. at 235-37.
35. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238-39 (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.), affd after remand,
722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Rothberg v.
Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987); SEC v.
Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SEC v.
Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
37. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at 641.
38. Id.
39. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 15 (applying the misappropriation theory to a
securities trader and manager of the over-the-counter trading department of a New
York brokerage firm); Cherif 933 F.2d at 405-06 (applying the misappropriation the-
ory to a former bank employee); Clark, 915 F.2d at 441 (applying the misappropria-
tion theory to a president of a corporation which produced and sold medical sup-
plies); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying the misap-
propriation theory to a reporter for a financial newspaper), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987);
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (1984) (applying the misappropriation theory to an
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ory has been used in situations occurring outside the employ-
ment context. 4°
Because a mere breach of a fiduciary duty will not satisfy the
fraud element of Rule 10b-5, 41 proponents of the misappropria-
tion theory have argued that fraud is present in the misappro-
priation of confidential corporate information. The circuit courts
which have adopted the theory have analyzed the fraud element
with various degrees of precision.42 The most analytic and pre-
cise analysis focuses on the employee's express or implied repre-
sentation to an employer that the employee will uphold a duty of
confidentiality and not use the entrusted information to the
employee's benefit.' The Ninth Circuit noted:
[Bly becoming part of a fiduciary or similar relationship, an individual is
implicitly stating that she will not divulge or use to her own advantage
information entrusted to her in the utmost confidence. She deceives the
other party by playing the role of the trustworthy employee or agent; she
defrauds it by actually using the stolen information to its detriment."
This conception of the fraud element under the misappropriation
theory arguably satisfies the elements of common law fraud in
the following way: The misappropriator makes a false representa-
tion, either expressly or impliedly, to the employer concerning the
material fact of the employee's willingness to uphold the duty of
confidentiality; the employee knows of the falsity of the represen-
tation and makes the representation to induce the reliance of the
employer; and the employer justifiably relies and is consequently
harmed by the misappropriation. The Fourth Circuit, in part,
found the misappropriation theory problematic with respect to
the materiality and scienter requirements. 45 These elements are
discussed in Section II of this comment.
employee of a financial printing company), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
40. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) (applying the mis-
appropriation theory to a father and son relationship), rev'd on other grounds, 773
F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(applying the misappropriation theory to a psychiatrist-patient relationship).
41. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (M'e lan-
guage of sec. 10b gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct
not involving manipulation or deception.").
42. See, e.g., Newman, 664 F.2d at 17. The Newman court stated: "[W]e need
spend little time on the issue of fraud and deceit. . . . [T]he defendant "misappro-
priated--stole to put it bluntly valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in
the utmost confidence." Id. (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing)).
43. Clark, 915 F.2d at 448.
44. Id.




To satisfy the harm element of common law fraud, the SEC
has advanced the argument that the employer and the employer's
corporate clients have been injured. For example, the argument
has been advanced that a financial printer 6 and an investment
banking firm"7 suffered injury when their reputations as safe
repositories for corporate confidential information had been sul-
lied by misappropriation. The corporate clients of employers have
also been found to have been injured by the misappropriation.
The circuit courts have alluded to the principle that corporate
information is property to a corporation to which it has an ex-
clusive right." When the inside information is misappropriated,
the corporation is injured by losing the exclusive right to the
information. This argument gains support in Carpenter v. United
States,' in which the Supreme Court established that a compa-
ny can have a property right in corporate information under the
mail fraud statute. ° Additionally, in takeover situations, a cor-
porate client that is an acquiring company can be injured by the
misappropriation of information by virtue of the inflation of the
value of the target stock which rises due to increased market ac-
tivity.
51
To justify locating the fraud outside of the security transaction,
the circuit courts have liberally interpreted the "in connection"
language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.5 2 Though the employ-
er and the employer's corporate clients take no part in the securi-
ty transaction, the courts have based culpability on the fact that
the information used in the security transaction originated from
the defrauded employer and corporate clients."3
This concept of the fraud element of Rule 10b-5 is markedly
different than that advanced by Chief Justice Burger in his
Chiarella dissent. The circuit courts have located the fraud out-
side of the security transaction.' A plausible explanation for
46. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 202 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985).
47. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir.), aft'd after re-
mand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
48. Clark, 915 F.2d at 448-49 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,
27-28 (1987)).
49. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
50. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25-27.
51. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
52. Id. at 18. The Second Circuit stated: "[Slince appellee's sole purpose in
participating in the misappropriation of confidential takeover information was to
purchase shares of the target companies, we find little merit in his disavowal of a
connection between the fraud and the purchase." Id.
53. Id.
54. Clark, 915 F.2d at 445.
1996 1065
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this change is that having failed to base the duty of disclosure on
the principle of fairness as was tried in Cady Roberts and its
progeny, and understanding the Court's reluctance to create a
"federal fiduciary duty," the SEC looked elsewhere for the fraud.
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to decide
the validity of the misappropriation theory as a basis for criminal
liability under Rule 10b-5.55 However, the Court divided evenly
on the issue of whether the conviction could be grounded on the
misappropriation theory.66 Thus, the conviction was affirmed.
The legitimacy of the misappropriation theory was not settled,
because a holding which issues from an evenly divided court has
no precedential value.
II. UNITED STATES V. BRYAN
A. The Invalidation of the Misappropriation Theory
Until the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Bry-
an, 7 the validity of the misappropriation theory was never seri-
ously questioned. In Bryan, a director of the West Virginia State
lottery used his position in the government to misappropriate
confidential corporate information entrusted to the lottery com-
mission in a bidding process to award contracts to supply video
lottery machines to the state.58 Knowing which video company
would win the bid, Bryan bought stock in the company based on
the non-public information. 9 Bryan was convicted of securities
fraud under the misappropriation theory of Rule 10b-5. 60
In reviewing the conviction, the Fourth Circuit did not content
itself with the question of whether Bryan's conduct violated Rule
10b-5 under the misappropriation theory. Rather, the court went
to the heart of the matter and asked whether criminal liability
under Rule 10b-5 could be based on the misappropriation theo-
ry.
61
The Fourth Circuit premised its analysis on essentially two
principles. First, the fraud element of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 require a misrepresentation or an omission to disclose when
under a duty to do so.6" The second principle, which is inter-
55. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
56. Id.
57. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
58. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 938.
59. Id. at 939.
60. Id. at 943.
61. Id. at 945.
62. Id. at 946 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470 (1977)
Vol. 34:10571066
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twined with the first, mandates that the fraud has to directly
affect a purchaser or seller of securities."3 The Fourth Circuit
determined that the misappropriation theory allowed prosecution
under Rule 10b-5 without satisfying either requirement."
The Fourth Circuit based its narrow definition of fraud on
precedent established in civil suits arising under Rule 1Ob-5.'
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green"5 and Central Bank of Den-
ver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver67 the Supreme Court de-
fined the fraud element of Rule 10b-5 as the making of a materi-
al misrepresentation or the non-disclosure of material informa-
tion when under a duty to disclose." According to the Fourth
Circuit, the Supreme Court, in Dirks v. SEC,69 established this
restricted definition of fraud in the criminal context of Rule 10b-
5.70
To the Fourth Circuit, the misappropriation theory not only
fails to satisfy this definition of fraud, it also does not involve
and Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439,
1448 (1994)).
63. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945.
64. Id. at 944.
65. Id. at 946. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not expressly provide for a
civil action. The civil action was created in the seminal case of Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
66. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, minority shareholders brought a civil ac-
tion, on the basis of Rule 10b-5, against a corporation to set aside a merger and to
recover the fair value of their stock, alleging that the corporation fraudulently ap-
praised the stock value when exercising its statutory right to buy out minority
shareholders. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 462. Holding that Rule 10b-5 prohibits only acts
which involve deception and finding no indication of manipulation in the acts of the
defendants, the Court reversed the circuit court, which had concluded that Rule 10b-
5 covers breaches of fiduciary duty that do not involve deception. Id. at 472-73, 479-
80.
67. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). In Central Bank, purchasers of certain bonds filed
a Rule 10b-5 claim against the public building authority that issued the bonds, the
bond's underwriters, the developer of the land in question and Central Bank as
indenture trustee of the bonds after the building authority defaulted on the bonds.
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443. The central issue of the case was whether a claim
of aiding and abetting can be made under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 1444. In concluding
that such a claim cannot be asserted under the rule, the Court stated that "the
statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the
commission of a manipulative act." Id. at 1448.
68. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946 (citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472, 476 and Central
Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448).
69. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, a broker who specialized in insurance com-
pany securities obtained confidential corporate information from a former officer of
an insurance company, that the company's assets were fraudulently overstated.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646. The SEC prosecuted Dirks under Rule 10b-5 for sharing this
information with his clients who, after learning of the overstatement, sold their
stock in the company. Id. Dirks is significant in the development of Rule 10b-5 case
law for establishing the requisites for tippee liability.
70. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654).
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conduct which is "fraudulent."71 According to the Fourth Circuit,
a misappropriation of inside information is more like a theft of
information and merely a fiduciary breach which, in most cases,
does not involve a misrepresentation or nondisclosure required
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.71 While the misappropri-
ation of corporate information had been considered "fraudulent"
under the mail fraud statute, the Fourth Circuit observed that
the terms of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are "virtually" terms of
art which prohibit such expansion.73
The Fourth Circuit found the misappropriation theory to be
problematic with respect to the materiality and scienter require-
ments of common law fraud.7' Presuming that the misrepresen-
tation necessarily had to concern an investment decision, the
court found that any misrepresentation involved in the misappro-
priation of information was meaningless with respect to Rule
10b-5 because it goes to the source of the information which was
disconnected from the security transaction.75  The Fourth
Circuit's analysis of the scienter requirement was less precise,
alluding to the fact that a promise to adhere to a fiduciary duty
is different from a promise to perform an act in the future where
the promise is part of the consideration for the sale of securi-
ties.7" Conceivably, the Fourth Circuit considered the promise to
be a faithful fiduciary a general promise which occurs prior to the
formation of an intent to steal the information. According to this
conception, the assumption of the duty of confidentiality is dis-
joined from the misappropriation and renders the misappropria-
tion a mere breach of the duty of confidentiality without an in-
tent to deceive.
In conjunction with restricting the definition of "fraud," the
Fourth Circuit criticized the misappropriation theory for extend-
ing the reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to situations where
neither the purchaser nor the seller of securities was defraud-
ed.77 The court found that the principle purpose of securities
laws is to protect investors.7" The misappropriation theory, ac-
cording to the Fourth Circuit, ignores this limited congressional
purpose by turning Section 10(b) from a law intended to protect
market participants into a federal common law regulating all
71. Id. at 949.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 952.
74. Id. at 949 nn. 14 & 16.
75. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949-50 n.16.
76. Id. at 949 n.14.
77. Id. at 946-48.
78. Id. at 946-47.
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trust relationships. 9 The Fourth Circuit cited Chiarella to sup-
port the contention that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only pro-
hibit fraud directed at purchasers and sellers of securities." The
Fourth Circuit concluded that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 ex-
tend, at most, only to other investors and persons with a similar
interest in the actual transaction.8'
Based on the narrow definition of fraud as a failure to disclose
and on the interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that
the fraud necessarily be on purchasers or sellers of securities,
which follows from the limited definition of fraud, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory as a basis for crimi-
nal liability under Rule 10b-5. 2
B. The Shortcomings of Bryan
In Bryan, the Fourth Circuit invalidated the misappropriation
theory based on the erroneous notion that the Supreme Court in
Chiarella and Dirks had conclusively defined the element of
fraud, in context to criminal actions under Rule 10b-5, in terms
of the failure to disclose or abstain when under a duty to do so.
However, the Supreme Court did not speak definitively to pre-
clude application of the misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-
5. In Chiarella, the Court did not reach the issue of the validity
of the misappropriation theory because it was not submitted to
the jury. The Court reversed the conviction after conducting an
analysis focused solely on the traditional theory of culpability. In
Dirks, the Court made a general statement that an insider vio-
lates Rule 10b-5 "only where he fails to disclose material non-
public information before trading on it and makes 'secret prof-
its.'"' However, in Dirks, the Court made this statement in a
general discussion of the traditional theory of fraud and did not
directly confront the issue regarding the definition of fraud with
respect to the misappropriation theory. The Supreme Court clear-
ly has not spoken as definitively as the Fourth Circuit would lead
one to believe with respect to criminal actions under Rule 10b-5.
To bolster its argument the Fourth Circuit relied on Supreme
Court precedent concerning civil actions under Rule 10b-5. It is
79. Id. at 950.
80. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228).
81. Id. at 948.
82. Id. at 952-53. The Fourth Circuit also emphasized that misappropriators
would be vulnerable to prosecution under Rule 10b-5, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Chiarella and Dirks, and under the mail and wire fraud statute. Id. at
953.
83. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
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questionable whether the civil action should have such determin-
ing power over the criminal action because the civil action was
not mandated by either the statute or the rule. A more palatable
perspective is that a niche has been carved out for civil actions
which in no way delimits the fraud element of the criminal ac-
tion.
The differences between the civil and criminal actions with
respect to who brings the action, and for what purpose, also
makes the reference to the civil context tenuous. Typically, in
civil actions under Rule 10b-5, a shareholder brings suit to recov-
er the judicially created remedy. Two issues are integral to the
civil action under Rule 10b-5: (1) the plaintiff must establish that
he or she has standing or, in other words, has an interest in the
suit because the plaintiff has been injured; and (2) the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant had a fiduciary or similar duty
to disclose the material information.' " Thus, in civil cases of
non-disclosure, the fraud element of the action is essentially
defined by the disclose or abstain rule and must, therefore, di-
rectly affect the purchaser or seller who brings suit. However, the
criminal action of Rule 10b-5 is not so defined. The SEC brings
the action, so its burden is to prove that there was a fraud perpe-
trated in connection with a security transaction. The elements of
the criminal action are not limited as is the plaintiffs in a civil
suit because the statute and the rule do not specifically define
how and where the fraud must occur.
The "in connection" language in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
places some limitation on where the fraud takes place in relation
to the security transaction. This issue introduces the question of
the reasonableness of the misappropriation theory in light of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which is a different question, es-
sentially, than the one asked by the Fourth Circuit in Bryan. The
Fourth Circuit premised its analysis of the validity of the misap-
propriation theory on principles integral to civil actions and rea-
soned therefrom. Rejecting the applicability of these principles for
want of legislative and administrative mandate and for want of
Supreme Court guidance, analysis turns to the scope of the stat-
ute and the rule in the criminal context specifically. The scope of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is discussed in Section III of this
comment.
The Bryan court refused to allow the analogy to the mail fraud
statute, arguing that the purpose of the securities laws is differ-




ent than the mail and wire fraud statute and, therefore, conclud-
ed that the broad concept of fraud developed in the mail fraud
context could not be used to define the "virtual terms of art" used
in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. However, similar to the mail
fraud statute, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as drafted, are gen-
eral anti-fraud provisions. The terms of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 become "terms of art" when the presumption is made that
the terms have been narrowly defined by Chiarella, Dirks, Santa
Fe and Central Bank. Rejecting the conclusiveness of these Su-
preme Court cases on the issue of the scope of Rule 10b-5, the
terms of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have yet to be defined
sufficiently enough to render them "terms of art." In this respect,
the analogy to the broad concept of fraud in the mail fraud con-
text is valid.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the materiality requirement
under the misappropriation theory can also be criticized for mak-
ing a presumption that has not been definitively settled by the
Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit assumed that the fraud must
be perpetrated on a purchaser or a seller. From this presumption,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the fraud must bear on an in-
vestment decision. However, the field opens up after rejecting
this premise. The materiality element can arguably be satisfied
by a fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the willingness to
uphold the duty of confidentiality with respect to material non-
public corporate information.
The Fourth Circuit attacked the misappropriation theory, in
part, for failing to satisfy the scienter element of fraud. To the
court, the promise to be a faithful fiduciary usually does not
involve deception. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded that a
misappropriation of information is merely a breach of a fiduciary
duty. However, deception is surely present. The traditional theo-
ry established the scienter requirement in the circumstance
where the insider had non-public information and intentionally
failed to disclose the information in a securities sale to profit
from an informational advantage. The misappropriation theory,
on the other hand, bases the scienter requirement on the
employee's intentional deception of the employer with respect to
the employee's willingness to uphold the duty of confidentiality.
When an employee makes a representation when beginning em-
ployment, either expressly or implicitly, that the employee will
uphold a duty of confidentiality, the employee usually does not
intend to misappropriate information at that time. The intent to
steal information usually develops later. However, though made
earlier in time, the representation does not have to be disjoined
from the misappropriation. Conceiving the representation of will-
1996 1071
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ingness to uphold the duty as continuing, the employee reasserts
the willingness each time access to information is gained. When
the employee accesses the information and forms an intent to
misappropriate, a simultaneous deception and breach of the duty
of confidentiality occurs. In this way, the misappropriation of
inside information involves deception.
III. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5 AND
THEIR RESPECTIVE HISTORIES
Even the Fourth Circuit, in Bryan, recognized that the lan-
guage of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is sufficiently general to
accommodate the misappropriation theory." Described as being
"notoriously vague,"" Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are suffi-
ciently general in four respects: the language of the statute and
rule encompasses "any person;" Rule 10b-5 uses the terms "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" and "any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit" which extends to many practices; both the statute and the
rule only require that the fraud occur "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security;" and Section 10(b) gives the
SEC authority to regulate the securities market in the "public in-
terest." ' Responding to the general language of Section 10(b),
the Supreme Court described the securities law as a "catch-all"
anti-fraud provision."
The legislative history accompanying the enactment of Section
10(b) provides little guidance in determining what Congress in-
tended when it created the enabling statute.89 An earlier version
of Section 10(b), which was attached to the Senate Report that
was sent to Congress to consider the final version, stated that it
sought to protect "the interests of investors."0 However, the fi-
nal version of Section 10(b) did not retain this narrow scope.
Instead, Congress gave the SEC the power to promulgate rules
and regulations "as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors."91 With respect to the types
of practices sought to be prohibited by the statute and its rules
85. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945.
86. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448 (9th Cir. 1990).
87. See supra notes 7 and 9 for the texts of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, re-
spectively.
88. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 202 (1976)).
89. Clark, 915 F.2d at 450.
90. Id. at 450 n.19 (citing S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 10b (1934)).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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and regulations, the Senate Report stated that "effective regula-
tion must include several clear statutory provisions reinforced by
penal and civil sanctions, aimed at those manipulative and de-
ceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no use-
ful function.92 Courts have referred to the "no useful function"
language of the Senate Report to support the contention that
Congress meant to define the scope of Rule 10b-5 broadly.93
The administrative history of Rule 10b-5 reveals that the SEC
did not authorize the misappropriation theory at the time of the
rule's promulgation nor, at that time, envision a need for it. For-
mer SEC Assistant Solicitor Milton Freeman, who drafted the
rule, has described the creation of Rule 10b-5 simply as a sponta-
neous response to the need for a provision prohibiting fraud in
the purchase of securities.9"
There is evidence that the SEC only contemplated protecting
investors when it created Rule 10b-5. Following the adoption of
the rule, the SEC issued a statement in which it announced that
the rule prohibits individuals "from buying securities if they
engage in fraud in their purchase. ' Again, in its 1942 annual
report, the SEC stated that the rule was adopted as "additional
protection to investors."96
92. Clark, 915 F.2d at 450 (citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1934)).
93. Id.
94. Describing the circumstances out of which Rule lOb-5 arose, former SEC
Assistant Solicitor Milton Freeman stated:
I was sitting in my office in the SEC building in Philadelphia and I received
a call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and Ex-
change Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone with Paul
Rowen," who was then the SEC Regional Administrator in Boston, "and he
told me about the president of some company in Boston who is going around
buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a
share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a
share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came
upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I
looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had
there was where "in connection with the purchase and sale" should be, and we
decided it should be at the end. We called the Commission and we got on the
calendar, and I don't remember whether we got there that morning or after
lunch. We passed around a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicating ap-
proval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said,
"we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it happened.
Milton Freeman, Remarks before the Conference on Codification of the Federal Secu-
rities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
95. Clark, 915 F.2d at 450 n.21 (quoting SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21,
1942)).
96. Id. (quoting EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 10 (1942)).
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Although the SEC statements concerning the adoption of the
rule seemingly narrow the scope of Rule 10b-5 and foreclose the
possibility of accommodating other interpretations regarding the
scope of Rule 10b-5, such as the misappropriation theory, the
unreflective and spontaneous act which created Rule 10b-5 sug-
gests that the SEC had but a simple purpose in adopting the rule
and did not intend to limit its scope. Moreover, the general grant
of power given to the SEC in the enabling legislation suggests
that Congress gave the SEC power to determine the scope of
Rule 10b-5 over time to account for "unforseen species of
fraud." 7
Congress, on two later occasions, has made it clear that the
misappropriation theory is consistent with Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. A 1984 House Report discussing the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984, which amended the 1934 Act, stated that,
"[s]ince its creation, the [SEC] has.., appropriately used the
antifraud provisions to remedy unlawful trading.., by persons
in a variety of positions of trust and confidence who have illegally
acquired or illegally used material non-public information."' Re-
ferring specifically to misappropriation cases, the report stated:
[I]n certain widely-publicized instances, agents of tender offerors and
persons contemplating a merger or acquisition have used for personal
gain information entrusted to them solely for a business purpose. Such
conversion for personal gain of information lawfully obtained abuses rela-
tionships of trust and confidence and is no less reprehensible than the
outright theft of nonpublic information."
The report then stated that the misappropriation of confidential
information has been held to be unlawful in other areas of the
law and that "Congress has not sanctioned a less rigorous code of
conduct under the federal securities laws."100
Congress again discussed the misappropriation theory when it
considered enacting the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988. Recognizing the Carpenter decision, in
which the Supreme Court evenly split over the application of the
misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5, the House Committee
voiced its support for the theory under Section 10b and Rule 10b-
5.10 Responding to a suggestion that the 1934 Act be amended
97. Id. at 451.
98. Id. at 452 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277-78).
99. Id.
100. Clark, 915 F.2d at 452.
101. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 7, 11 (1988), reprint-
ed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044, 6048).
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to expressly create a private cause of action in order to preclude
application of the misappropriation theory, the Committee em-
phasized the remedial purposes of the Act and found that the
misappropriation theory fulfills the purpose of determining when
trading on inside information is unlawful."2
Neither the language of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 nor the re-
spective legislative and administrative histories specifically limit
the fraud element of Rule 10b-5 to the disclosure rule or to the
security transaction. Additionally, subsequent congressional
statements evidence the viability of the theory as a basis for
criminal action under Rule 10b-5.
IV. JuDcIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIE ACTIONS
A rule promulgated by an agency must be moored in the lan-
guage of the enabling statute."3 Enabling statutes, however,
are often drafted broadly and, as a result, contain ambigu-
ities.' 0 The statutes are drafted broadly for a number of rea-
sons. Realizing that it is impossible to precisely draft a statute
that will account for the myriad of issues likely to arise under
the statute, Congress drafts enabling legislation in general
terms."5 Also, lacking the time and expertise necessary to legis-
late in certain specialized areas, Congress delegates regulatory
power to an agency which has both the time and knowledge nec-
essary to create functional regulation.
The agency which administers the statute and the judiciary
participate in giving meaning to an enabling statute." When
an agency adopts a rule pursuant to the enabling legislation, it
gives the statute meaning.1"7 The court then reviews the action
of the agency to ensure that the rule accords with the standards
set forth in the enabling statute.10 8
A Construction and Interpretation of an Enabling Statute
At this point, it is important to make a distinction between an
issue of policy and an issue of law which arises when an agency
seeks to enforce a statute. The difference between the two types
102. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 910 at 26-27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6063-64).
103. KENNETH C. DAviS & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 3.1 (3d ed. 1994).







of issues is significant in that each requires different degrees of
judicial deference.' The difference between an issue of policy
and an issue of law reduces to the question: Did Congress resolve
the issue in the enabling legislation?.. If Congress has clearly
spoken to the issue, a reviewing court is presented with an issue
of law."' In this situation, Congress has provided the law and
the agency and the judiciary must find and apply the law." In
such cases, the agency is only permitted to interpret the law as it
is given and the reviewing court must ensure that the agency
interpretation is reasonably grounded in the law. However, if
Congress has left a gap for the agency to fill, the court is present-
ed with an issue of policy. In this situation, the agency is given
the power to construct the statute by making policy decisions."'
Administrative policy-making is acceptable as long as it stays
within the bounds set by the enabling legislation. "4 The import
of the distinction between an issue of law and an issue of policy
is that a court must be more deferential in respect to an agency's
policy decision than to a legal interpretation. When interpreting
a statute, the judiciary ultimately decides the acceptability of the
interpretation."' When a policy decision arises, however, it is
the job of the agency, not of the courts, to decide which policy to
follow."" When constructing a statute, the judiciary must avoid
substituting its own policy preferences for the agency's." The
judicial branch of government has not been vested with the pow-
er to make such decisions."8
Section 10(b), drafted as broadly as it is, suggests that Con-
gress intended to grant the SEC some policy-making power with
respect to who can be prosecuted and what types of fraud securi-
ties laws prohibit. As a result of this orientation, the courts may
have to proceed with more caution when considering the validity
of the misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5 in order to avoid
substituting its own policy in lieu of the SEC's or to unduly re-
strict the SEC's power to make policy."'
109. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 103, § 3.3.





114. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 103, § 3.2 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-
44).
115. Id- § 3.1.
116. Id § 3.3.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Michael P. Kenny and Teresa D. Thebaut argue that the circuit courts
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When a court reviews an agency action which involves a mat-
ter of policy-making and construction of a statute, it applies a
two-step test:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be neces-
sary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute. '2
When Congress has expressly delegated the power to an agency
to fill a gap in a statute, the agency is given authority to eluci-
date the provisions in the statute through regulation.2 1 If the
agency creates a rule pursuant to an expressed delegation, the
regulation will be adjudged a "permissible construction of the
statute" if it is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute.12 If Congress implicitly delegates power to an
agency to fill a gap left in a statute, the court asks whether the
regulation is reasonable in light of the enabling legislation to
determine if such a regulation is a permissible construction.'u
An analysis of the language of Section 10(b) reveals that Con-
gress neither directly spoke to the issue of the scope of Section
10(b) nor expressly granted the SEC policy-making power to de-
termine who may be prosecuted under the law, what type of
fraud it sought to prohibit and where the fraud must occur in
relation to a security transaction. Rather, the general terminolo-
gy used in the enabling statute suggests that Congress intended
to leave its scope broad and undefined. In this way, Congress
implicitly granted the SEC policy-making authority to place limi-
which have adopted the misappropriation theory have improperly imposed judicial
policy on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut,
Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropria-
tion Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139 (1995). On the contrary, the cir-
cuit courts which have recognized the theory have properly deferred to the SEC's
reasonable construction of Section 10(b). The Fourth Circuit has improperly restrict-
ed the SEC's policy-making authority and, in effect, imposed judicial policy.
120. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).





tations, as it saw fit, on criminal actions arising under Section
10(b). To determine whether the misappropriation theory is a
permissible construction of Section 10(b), a court must determine
whether the misappropriation theory is reasonable with respect
to the language and purpose of Section 10(b).
The misappropriation theory, as a policy determination, is
clearly within the mandate of Section 10(b). It has been found
that the misappropriation theory "fits comfortably" within the
"notoriously vague" terms of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.'
The phraseology of "any person" and "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" suggests that the fraud element
of Section 10(b), and Rule 10b-5, can be established by conduct
occurring outside of the security transaction. The legitimacy of
the theory is buttressed by the "public interest" language of Sec-
tion 10(b). The misappropriation theory discourages persons from
stealing corporate information and makes for a more fair securi-
ties market. Moreover, though the fraud arises outside of the
security transaction, the fraud involves inside information which
is used in the security transaction. The seller of securities, there-
fore, is incidentally affected by the misappropriation. Thus, the
concept of fraud integral to the misappropriation theory is suffi-
ciently connected to the security transaction.
The argument that the misappropriation theory is invalid, in
part, because its late introduction into the development of Rule
10b-5 fails to give the public notice of its restrictions, '25 is with-
out merit. According to the principles of administrative policy-
making, an agency is permitted to revise its conception of a stat-
ute or broaden it if such change is within the boundaries of the
enabling legislation.' 6 Clearly, the SEC did not, at the time of
the early litigation under Rule 10b-5, realize Rule 10b-5's poten-
tial. The new concept of fraud developed under the theory can be
considered an evolution of the rule. The misappropriation theory,
rooted as it is in the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
was always present in a latent form. The SEC has only recently
begun to act on it.
When the Bryan court adjudged Section 10(b) as merely an
instrument to protect investors and rejected the misappropriation
theory, the court verged on judicial policy-making. Though a
court must resolve the dispute before it, and must determine
which of various policy arguments most adequately satisfy the
enabling legislation, the court must have evidence before it to
124. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448-49 (9th Cir. 1990).
125. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950-51.
126. DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 103, § 3.5.
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conclude that the agency's policy is unreasonable in light of the
enabling legislation. The Fourth Circuit chose to reject the mis-
appropriation theory on grounds supported by little legislative
history and case treatment of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that
did not absolutely restrict the scope of the Rule 10b-5, in its
criminal dimension, to the "disclose or abstain" rule.
For the above stated reasons, it cannot be concluded that the
misappropriation theory is an unreasonable policy decision of the
SEC under Section 10(b).
B. Judicial Review of an Agency's Interpretation of its Own Rule
When an interpretation of an administrative regulation is
presented to a court for review, the court must refer to the
agency's interpretation of the regulation if the meaning of the
terms are in doubt.127 Congressional intent may determine the
appropriate interpretation when various interpretations are
advanced. 2 ' The Supreme Court has stated, however, that "the
ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which
becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation."'29
Judicial deference to an agency interpretation of its own rule is
commonsensical. The agency is usually in a better position to de-
termine the intended meaning and application of a regulation
that it issued.3 ' However, in the case of Rule 10b-5, there is
scant administrative history to determine the intended meaning
of the terms bearing on the fraud element. The story provided by
Milton Freeman and the SEC statements in 1942 announcing the
birth of Rule 10b-5 only reveal a lack of consideration with re-
spect to the issue of the rule's scope. The SEC, at the creation of
Rule 10b-5, simply intended to close a gap left by Section 17(a).
It is reasonable to conclude that because the SEC did not serious-
ly consider the scope of Rule 10b-5, it did not intend to restrict
the meaning of the terms "any person," "defraud," "fraud and
deceit" and "in connection with a purchase or sale" in any way.
The SEC did not authorize the misappropriation theory at the
genesis of Rule 10b-5 but it also did not intend to preclude its
application. To determine whether the SEC's interpretation of
Rule 10b-5 is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-







tion, inquiry must go elsewhere than to an intended meaning.
The SEC's interpretation should be analyzed by the language of
the rule itself. The question to be answered is whether the SEC's
advocacy of the misappropriation theory is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the wording of Rule 10b-5.
Though courts typically give deference to an agency's interpre-
tation of its own rule under the "plainly erroneous or inconsis-
tent" standard, courts will not defer to the agency interpretation
if the regulation uses a common law term which is at issue or is
a "disingenuous exercise in facesaving revisionism."131
1. The Lack of Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Common-Law Terms
When an agency uses a common-law term in a regulation,
deference is not required because the interpretation of the com-
mon-law term is not based on the expertise of the agency.132
The judiciary is in a superior position to provide the interpreta-
tion of common-law terms.133 If the agency seeks to apply an-
other meaning than that traditionally applied by the common
law, the notice requirement would be violated in that the rule
under the desired interpretation becomes unpredictable.'"
Because Rule 10b-5 uses the terms "defraud" and "fraud and
deceit," the judiciary is not bound to defer to the SEC's interpre-
tation of these terms. However, this is not cause for concern for
the proponents of the misappropriation theory. The SEC does not
seek to apply Rule 10b-5 in a way that changes the accepted
meaning of the terms. As was discussed in Sections I and II.B of
this comment, the fraud which occurs in the misappropriation of
confidential corporate information satisfies the common law ele-
ments of fraud. The employee falsely represents to the employer
a willingness to uphold the duty of confidentiality, to induce the
reliance of the employer, and the employer justifiably relies on
the employee's representation and consequently suffers harm.
The essential issue in the debate is the location of the fraud in
relation to the security transaction. Because the language of Rule
10b-5 essentially tracks the language of Section 10(b), the agency
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 involves the policy-making activity
discussed above. The policy decision to broaden the scope of Rule
10b-5 to bring within its ambit persons who misappropriate non-
131. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 103, § 6.10.




public corporate information is not unreasonable in light of the
inclusive language of Section 10(b). For similar reasons, the
SEC's interpretation of Rule 10b-5 as including misappropriators
cannot be said to be plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.
2. "Disingenuous Exercise in Face-Saving Revisionism"
If an agency interpretation is issued in suspicious circumstanc-
es and there is evidence that the agency adopted the opposite
interpretation until it was subjected to public criticism, a court
may reject the interpretation as a disingenuous interpretation
done merely to save face.'35 Though the misappropriation the-
ory was adopted late in the development of Rule 10b-5, it can
hardly be held that this constitutes suspicious circumstances.
Rather, the creation of the misappropriation theory is more aptly
considered an evolutionary interpretation than a move to save
power it irresponsibly lost through incompetence. Moreover, Con-
gress has not criticized the SEC for advocating the misappropria-
tion theory but has supported its application. As was discussed,
there is evidence that early case treatment of Rule 10b-5 limited
the scope of the rule to the disclose or abstain rule. However, this
evidence does not establish that the SEC intended to absolutely
limit Rule 10b-5 in such a way. Again, conceiving the birth of the
misappropriation theory as an evolutionary growth of Rule 10b-5
and considering the "comfortable fit" of the theory to the rule's
conceptual structure, the advocacy of the theory does not reek of
desperation or face-saving.
V. CONCLUSION
After consideration, it is clear that the Bryan court was prema-
ture in sounding the death-knell of the misappropriation theory.
The premise that the scope of Rule 10b-5 was limited by prior
Supreme Court case law is simply incorrect. When the issue of
the scope of Rule 10b-5 again appears before a court, the unset-
tled state of the law in this area must be recognized and the
court must grant the SEC some degree of deference when con-
structing the statute and interpreting the rule. The misappropri-
ation theory, at this point in the development of Rule 10b-5, must
be judged by the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and
their respective histories. That the language of Section 10(b) and
135. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Admin., 453 F. Supp. 203,
afr'd, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. CL App. 1978)).
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Rule 10b-5 provide fertile ground for the theory and as the legis-
lative and administrative histories do not reveal an opposing
intent, it must be concluded that the misappropriation theory is a
reasonable construction of Section 10(b) and is not plainly errone-
ous or inconsistent with Rule 10b-5.
Until the issue of the scope of Rule 10b-5 is settled by the
Supreme Court, the SEC must decide whether to acquiesce in the
Fourth Circuit's decision. Whether an agency must forego apply-
ing a particular interpretation, which has been rejected by a
circuit court, in the very circuit which rejected the interpretation
or in other circuits has not been definitively resolved. 3 ' Nonac-
quiescence is supported by numerous rationales. Judicial error,
conflicting circuit court decisions, the high incidence of reversal,
the newness of the issue, the Court's predilection to have the
issue debated in other circuits after one circuit has overturned
the interpretation, and the goal of national uniformity in applica-
tion of regulations support the act of nonacquiescence." 7 It may
be some time before the Supreme Court decides the issue of the
validity of the misappropriation theory. In the interim, the SEC
should not acquiesce in the Fourth Circuit's Bryan decision.
Marc Mellett
136. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 103, § 2.9.
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